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Abstract 
This paper investigates why multinational ownership is found to increase the probability that a 
plant will exit.  It does so by using Japanese plant data linked to firm data.  Plants belonging to 
a multinational are 9 percentage points more likely to exit when plant, firm and industry 
characteristics are conditioned on.  We find that the “footloose” effect is attributable to 
multinationals closing their weakest plants.  Plants that are small, capital un-intensive and have 
low input intensities relative to the firm are more vulnerable to closure within multinationals.  
We also find a strong similarity between the plants that are shut by multiplant firms regardless 
of whether they have overseas affiliates or not. 
 
JEL classification: D21, D24, F15, F23, L20, L6 
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Plants owned by multinational firms are known to possess characteristics that reduce their likelihood of 
closure compared to non-multinationals. Their plants are generally larger more capital intensive and more 
productive, all factors shown in numerous contexts to be negatively associated with the probability of exit. 
Conditional on these superior characteristics, multinational firms are however more likely to shut their 
plants. Bernard and Jensen (2007) find for example that in the United States multinational ownership 
increases the probability of plant death by 4.5%, controlling for a wide ranging set of plant and firm 
characteristics.  Similar evidence has been found for manufacturing plants in Belgium by van Beveren 
(2006), Sweden by Bandick (2007), Japan by Kimura and Kiyota (2006) and Chile by Alvarez and Görg 
(2005). As a consequence of evidence such as this, multinationals have become labelled as ‘footloose’. 
The theories used to explain the ‘footloose’ nature of multinational firms emphasise vertical over 
horizontal FDI motives. Under vertical FDI multinational firms change the geography of their production 
plants in response to changes in local costs.  They relocate low skill intensive activities for example, in 
countries that are low-skill abundant.  It has also been argued that wage costs, labour unrest, tax 
incentives and governmental subsidies are pivotal to the multinational location decision.   
Using data for Japan from 1994 to 2005 we firstly confirm that domestic multinationals are footloose. 
Plants belonging to a multinationals are 9 percentage points more likely to exit, when conditioned on a 
range of plant, firm and industry characteristics. We next explore the type of plants that are shut by 
multinationals, their relative characteristics compared to the rest of the firm, but also the behaviour of 
multinationals with other multi-plant firms that do not have overseas affiliates. We find from this a strong 
similarity in the type of pants that are shut. Plants are more likely to be closed if they are small, have low 
capital intensities and properties associated with the likelihood of offshoring, they produce intermediate 
inputs, are high wage or high levels of import. Finally, we explore whether it is this process of plant 
closure that explains why MNEs have been described as footloose. We find support for this view, indeed 
once we control for the characteristics of plants relative to the rest of the firm multinationals are actually 
significantly more likely to retain production in the home country. The footloose effect of MNEs is 
attributable to multinationals closing their weakest plants. 
   1
1. Introduction 
 
Plants owned by multinational firms are known to possess characteristics that reduce 
their likelihood of closure compared to non-multinationals. Their plants are generally 
larger more capital intensive and more productive, all factors shown in numerous 
contexts to be negatively associated with the probability of exit. Conditional on these 
superior characteristics, multinational firms are however more likely to shut their 
plants. Bernard and Jensen (2007) find for example that in the United States 
multinational ownership increases the probability of plant death by 4.5%, controlling 
for a wide ranging set of plant and firm characteristics.  Similar evidence has been 
found for manufacturing plants in Belgium by van Beveren (2006), Sweden by 
Bandick (2007), Japan by Kimura and Kiyota (2006) and Chile by Alvarez and Görg 
(2005). As a consequence of evidence such as this, multinationals have become 
labelled as ‘footloose’. 
 
The theories used to explain the ‘footloose’ nature of multinational firms emphasise 
vertical over horizontal FDI motives.
1 Under vertical FDI multinational firms change 
the geography of their production plants in response to changes in local costs (as in 
for example Antras and Helpman, 2004).  They relocate low skill intensive activities 
for example, in countries that are low-skill abundant.
2  Empirically much of the 
literature has focused on the factors that make locations relatively attractive, either 
generally or specific determinants, rather than linking those FDI decisions and the 
closure of production units in a different location however.
 3  Cowling and Sugden 
(1999) argue that wage costs, labour unrest, tax incentives and governmental 
subsidies are pivotal to the multinational location decision.  This view is echoed by 
Hood and Young (1997) who stress that multinationals in the United Kingdom only 
have “shallow roots” and are not fully integrated into the local economy.
4  Or more 
narrowly Devereux and Griffith (1998) alternatively focus on the roles of taxation and 
agglomeration.  They find that conditional on producing in Europe, industries with 
                                                 
1 Under horizontal FDI all stages of the production process are replicated in a different location. 
Models of this type include Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1997).  
2 In practice FDI decisions often contain elements of both horizontal and vertical motives. For 
theoretical models consistent with this view see Helpman (1984) Venables (1999) and Yeaple (~~~~). 
3 A more comprehensive review of this literature can be found in Blonigen (2005).  
4 Similarly, the ability of multinationals to shift production across borders is emphasised by Rodrik 
(1997) as an explanation for multinational’s relatively higher elasticity of demand for labour.   2
lower effective tax rates attract more U.S. multinationals.  Finally, recent theories of 
economic geography suggest that firms within the same industry may be drawn 
together through spillovers created by agglomeration effects.  Evidence in support of 
these models can be found in Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Head et al. (1995).  
 
A smaller number of papers have focused on the consequences of outward FDI 
decisions for other aspects of the firm. Head and Ries (2002), Brainard and Riker 
(1997a,b) and Braconier and Ekholm (2000) all find that firms undertaking outward 
FDI is associated with changes in employment levels and the skill-mix of workers at 
home. Most closely associated with this paper is the work of Simpson (2008). Using 
data for the UK she finds that overseas investment in low-wage economies leads to 
changes in the structure of firms, the closure of plants. These effects are found to be 
strongest for multinationals operating in low-skilled industries with affiliates located 
in low-skill abundant countries compared to firms in the same industry not investing 
in low wage countries.  
 
We build on this literature to investigate additional aspects of the adjustment process 
made by multinational firms. Using data for Japan from 1994 to 2005 we firstly 
confirm that domestic multinationals are footloose. Plants belonging to a 
multinationals are 9 percentage points more likely to exit, when conditioned on a 
range of plant and firm characteristics. We next explore the type of plants that are shut 
by multinationals, their relative characteristics compared to the rest of the firm, but 
also the behaviour of multinationals with other multi-plant firms that do not have 
overseas affiliates. The data on plants are sufficiently rich that we can do this for a 
wide range of characteristics including their size, capital intensity, average wage bill 
and material intensity. We find from this a strong similarity in the type of pants that 
are shut. Plants are more likely to be closed if they are small, have low capital 
intensities and properties associated with the likelihood of offshoring, they produce 
intermediate inputs, are high wage or high levels of import. Finally, we explore 
whether it is this process of plant closure that explains why MNEs have been 
described as footloose. We find support for this view, indeed once we control for the 
characteristics of plants relative to the rest of the firm multinationals are actually 
significantly more likely to retain production in the home country. The footloose 
effect of MNEs is attributable to multinationals closing their weakest plants.   3
 
The rest of the paper is proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the dataset we use.  
In Section 3 we investigate the magnitude of the “footloose” effect.  Section 4 studies 
the determinants of exit within multiplant firms.  In Section 5 we address why 
multinationals are “footloose”.  Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6.  
 
2.  Data and Summary 
 
Our primary data sources are the linked longitudinal data sets of the Census of 
Manufactures (COM) and the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and 
Activities (BSJBSA) for the period 1994-2005.  The COM data is an establishment-
level dataset administered by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).  
The COM data covers all plants with more than 3 employees located in Japan and 
includes information on plant characteristics, such as their location, number of 
employees, tangible assets, and value of shipments. Summary statistics of the main 
plant variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Plant Variables for the Entire Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Plant Size 169590 225 489 10 21309
   Number of Employees
Capital 169590 5119 23240 .07 1052705
   Millions of Japanese Yen
TFP 169590 .96 .35 -4.81 4.36
   Total Factor Productivity
Wages 169590 4.84 1.79 .03 90.55
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Intermediate Inputs 169590 6669 39879 .10 4276681
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Sales 169590 11321 54454 2.88 5855928
   Millions of Japanese Yen
 
Note: TFP is calculated in logarithms. 
 
The plant data is linked to the BSJBSA, a firm-level survey also conducted by METI. 
The survey includes all firms with more than 50 employees or with capital in excess 
of 30 million yen. This data source provides information on corporate characteristics 
such as R&D activity, exports, imports, the foreign ownership ratio, foreign direct   4
investment, and financial details.  The use of the BSJBSA restricts our regression 
analysis to include only firms with more than 50 employees, while the lack of data on 
intangible assets, necessary in the construction of TFP, means we are also forced to 
exclude plants with less than 10 employees.  Given our interest in the behaviour of 
multi-plant firms these are not thought to be serious exclusion restrictions. The 
average size of multiplant firms within our dataset is 514, while for multinationals 
this figure is even higher at 2,549.  In comparison single plant firms are 
approximately 7% of this size.  
 
There are 23,100 observations of multinational firms within the data, 16,970 of multi-
plant firms that are not multinational and 74,264 observations of single plant firms. 
These multinationals are mostly Japanese owned; foreign owned firms represent 
around 1 percent of all firms.
5  Summary statistics of the firm variables are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Firm-Level Variables by Firm Type
Variable MNE Multiplant Single Plant
Observations 23100 16970 74264
A g e 4 94 54 1
   In years
Size 1490 514 190
   Number of workers
Capital per Worker 20.92 15.36 14.22
   Millions of Japanese yen
Firm TFP 1.01 .96 .95
   Total Factor Productivity
R&D Complexity .02 .01 .01
  R&D divided by firm sales
Intermediate Inputs 71924 15410 5052
   Millions of Japanese yen
Foreign Ownership Dummy .01 .01 .01
   1 if a foreign firm holds more than 50% of capital
Export Dummy .78 .24 .18
   1 if the firm exports
Import Dummy .65 .19 .15
   1 if the firm imports
 
 
                                                 
5 Görg and Strobl (2005) also use the 50% criteria.  The value rises (but remains low) to 1.8% if we 
define foreign ownership according to the International Monetary Fund’s definition as being when a 
foreign firm holds in excess of 25% of capital.   5
In addition to the differences in average size multinationals and multi-plant firms are 
shown to be different in Table 2 across a number of dimensions. There is for example 
a clear decline in productivity and capital intensity from multinationals to multiplant 
firms and standalone enterprises.  Japanese firms appear to be highly globalised: 25% 
export, 21% import and 11% conduct FDI.  However, these patterns are far from 
uniform across firm type.  Over 80% of multinational firms export while only 17% of 
single plant firms have any sales abroad. Overall it would seem that Japanese MNEs 
display characteristics relative to other types of firm that are consistent with those 
found elsewhere in the literature (see for example the reviews in Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007, and Wagner, 2007). 
 
To identify plant entry and exit, we use a unique identification number given to each 
plant. A plant is deemed to have entered where it is observed at time t but was not 
observed in the dataset in the previous period, t-1.  Equivalently, an exiting plant is 
one that was observed at t-1 but not at time t.  A limitation of the data is that it is not 
possible to identify firm closure separately from employment falling below 3 and 
therefore exit from the sample.
6   
 
In Table 3 we report the entry and exit rates for each year of our sample and by the 
type of firm. A general observation would be that the percentage of firms that either 
enter or exit in the sample is low in Japan. Throughout the sample there are 2,230 
instances of entry and 3,392 observations of exit.  This feature of Japanese 
manufacturing has been previously commented on by Caballero et al. (2003), Peek 
and Rosengren (2003) and Ahearne and Shinada (2005). It is however consistent with 
the high average age of firms reported in Table 2, which even for single plant firms is 
over 40 years. We conclude from this average age that the low rate of exit is not likely 
explained by the size threshold imposed on the Japanese census data of 3 employees. 
This rate of exit is much lower than that found for other developed countries such as 
the US, where Bernard and Jensen (2004) calculate 32 per cent of plants are shut over 
a 5 year period. Finally, the table also reveals that the rate of plant exit is similar 
amongst single, multi-plant firms and MNEs. 
                                                 
6 We are more confident that we are not misclassifying mergers and acquisition as exit.  The number of 
mergers in Japan is low.   Shimizu (2001 cited in Kimura and Fujii, 2003) reports that of all companies 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1949 and 1998 of 1273 only 78 have conducted mergers.   6
 
Table 3: Annual Entry and Exit Rates
    Sample Average              MNE                     Multi (ex. MNE)        Single Plant
Year Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit
1994 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1995 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1996 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1997 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
1998 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
1999 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .04 .01 .03
2000 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03
2001 .02 .03 .01 .03 .02 .03 .02 .03
2002 .01 .03 .02 .03 .01 .02 .01 .03
2003 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
2004 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
2005 .02 - .02 - .02 - .02 -
Note: Exit rates are computed as the annual average rate of exit across three digit industries  
 
In Table 4 we compare the characteristics of continuing, entering and exiting plants, 
again separated by their organisation. In general the table shows that continuing plants 
are on average larger, have higher capital intensities, have greater sales, use more 
intermediate inputs and are more productive than exiting or entering plants.  They pay 
higher wages than entering plants, but lower wages than exiting plants.  On average, 
continuing plants are the most productive.  Exiting plants are smaller, use fewer 
intermediate inputs and have fewer sales than either continuing or entering plants.  
They also pay higher wages.  On average Table 4 suggests that these plants are not as 
productive as continuing plants, but are more productive than entrants.   
 
Ownership also appears to matter.  There is considerable heterogeneity in the size, 
productivity and capital intensity of plants depending on their owners and whether 
they enter, exit or continue.  Multinationals’ plants pay higher wages, have higher 
sales and use more intermediate inputs, regardless of whether they are an entering, 
exiting or continuing plant.  T-tests reveal that non-MNE owned plants are 
significantly smaller, less capital intensive and have lower TFP and wages than 
multinational owned plants.
7 
                                                 
7 T-tests are computed by subtracting the mean of group j from the mean value of group i to find the 
difference.  A t-test is then run where the null hypothesis is that the differences between the means are 
zero.   7
Table 4: Characteristics of Continuing, Entering and Exiting Plants by Firm Type
Firm Type
Variable MNE Multiplant Single Plant
Continue
Observations 51381 40013 72699
Plant Size 423 144 136
   Number of Employees
Capital per Worker 25.59 14.41 12.23
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant TFP 1.03 .94 .92
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant Wages 5.57 4.51 4.51
   Total Factor Productivity
Intermediate Inputs 15558 3156 2530
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant Sales 26275 5478 4320
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Exit
Observations 1316 1237 839
Plant Size 207 76 97
   Number of Employees
Capital per Worker 28.22 14.77 11.76
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant TFP 1.02 .88 .90
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant Wages 6.16 4.56 4.53
   Total Factor Productivity
Intermediate Inputs 6819 1678 1721
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant Sales 11678 2904 3004
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Enter
Observations 680 798 752
Plant Size 244 112 107
   Number of Employees
Capital per Worker 30.79 19.37 15.90
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant TFP .95 .86 .89
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant Wages 4.94 3.86 4.35
   Total Factor Productivity
Intermediate Inputs 8205 2513 2197
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant Sales 14447 4285 3480
   Millions of Japanese Yen
 
 
3.  What is the Magnitude of the “Footloose” Effect?   8
 
Generally we find that the plants that are most vulnerable to closure in Japan are 
similar to those studied in other countries by Dunne et al. (1989), Görg and Strobl 
(2003), Mata and Portugal (1994), Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) and Bernard and 
Jensen (2007).  Plants that are large, productive and capital intensive are less likely to 
exit.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in plant size reduces the 
probability of exit by 43 percentage points.  Of the firm characteristics it is size that 
has the strongest effect on reducing the probability of death; the point estimates on the 
capital intensity and TFP variables are substantially lower at 0.09 and 0.05.
8 Contrary 
to Bernard and Jensen’s (2007) findings for the United States, high-wage Japanese 
plants are more likely to exit. 
 
Unlike in studies of other countries we do not find firm exporting status to affect 
survival.  Although exporters are often believed to be less likely vulnerable to closure, 
the reason why this should be is not necessarily apparent.  However, international 
engagement matters when the firm imports.  In this case a plant is 3 percentage points 
more vulnerable to closure, a first indication that offshoring may be a motive behind 
the decision to shut plants.  We also find that a one standard deviation increase in firm 
R&D intensity makes a plant 5 percentage points more likely to die although this 
variable becomes insignificant when we the multiplant dummy is included in 
regression 2.   
 
Conditional on these plant characteristics we also find evidence that multinational 
firms are ‘footloose’. Within regression 1 we find that plants belonging to 
multinational firms are 13 percentage points less likely to survive.
9  In regression 2 
we test whether this effect is specific to multinationals or affects the closure decision 
of all multi-plant firms, even if they have no overseas investments. The existing 
evidence is ambiguous on this point. After controlling for plant features, Bernard and 
Jensen (2007) find that there is no difference in the likelihood of exit for plants owned 
by a multiplant firm in the United States, while Mata and Portugal (1994) and 
                                                 
8 If the probability of exit was initially 5 percent (0.05) then a one standard deviation increase in plant 
size would reduce it to 0.045 
9 When domestic and foreign multinational dummies are used the result remains. Domestic 
multinationals are 13 percentage points more likely to closedown their plants.  The effect is smaller for 
foreign multinationals at 3 percentage points though highly significant.   9
Bandick (2007) find the contrary results for Portugal and Sweden respectively.  For 
Japan we find that multiplant firms are 18 percentage points more likely to close their 
plants but that the “footloose” effect remains. Adding the indicator of whether the 
firms owns more than a single plant accounts for around 30% of the multinational 
effect in regression 1. 
 
Table 5: Multivariate Probits of Plant Exit 
Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Multinational Dummies
Multinational Dummy .13*** .09*** .01 .42*** 1.65***
(12.49) (8.33) (1.12) (6.02) (8.27)
Plant-level Variables
Size -.43*** -.40*** -1.24*** .29***
(-29.50) (-29.63) (-29.03) (-30.28)
Capital Intensity -.09*** -.09*** -.22*** .81***
(-8.79) (-9.32) (-7.71) (-9.47)
TFP -.05*** -.05*** -.32*** .73***
(-5.29) (-5.18) (-3.59) (-4.85)
Wages .11*** .11*** .91*** 2.05***
(9.02) (9.23) (9.15) (9.02)
Firm-level Variables
Export Dummy .02 .01 -.01 .00 1.01
(1.28) (.49) (-.62) (.07) (.21)
Import Dummy .03*** .03*** .02* .17** 1.18***
(2.97) (2.62) (1.72) (2.42) (2.60)
Multiplant Dummy .18*** .22*** 1.00*** 2.44***
(19.79) (23.73) (17.24) (17.25)
R&D Intensity .05*** .01 -.06*** .00 1.00
(5.32) (1.36) (-5.98) (1.43) (1.34)
Industry-level Variables
Grubel-Lloyd Index -.02 -.02 -.03 -.07 .90
(-.44) (-.35) (-.68) (-.40) (-.73)
LWPEN .02 .02 .03 .03 1.02
(.23) (.34) (.44) (.21) (.14)
OTHPEN -.06 -.06 -.05 -.15 .91
(-.77) (-.81) (-.62) (-.62) (-.54)
Sunk Costs -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.02 .96***
(-2.74) (-2.73) (-2.47) (-1.05) (-2.82)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 131559 131559 131559 15627 131669
Pseudo R
2 .13 .15 .07 - -
 
Notes: Standardised coefficients reported in regressions 1 to 3. Logit coefficient estimates are reported 
in 4 and hazard ratios are reported in 5.  Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
parentheses. The industry dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.   10
 
In regression 3 we test the extent to which the evidence for multinationals being more 
likely to close plants is conditional on the inclusion of other plant controls.  We test 
this by excluding the other plant controls.  We continue to observe that multiplant 
firms and importers are significantly more likely to shutdown their plants however, 
the multinational dummy is now insignificant.  Consistent with Bernard and Jensen’s 
(2002) findings for the United States we find that this view of multinationals as 
footloose is conditional. More generally multinationals are no more likely to 
closedown their plants than non-multinationals.   
 
Of the remaining industry level control variables included in regression 2 of Table 5, 
only industry sunk costs are found to have a significant effect on exit. This supports 
evidence from Dunne et al. (1988, 1989), Bernard and Jensen (2007) for the US, 
Geroski (1991a, 1991b) for the UK and Greenaway et al. (2008) for Sweden. For 
Japan we do not find industry measures of globalisation to affect exit.  This contrasts 
with the evidence from Bernard et al. (2006) who found that imports from both low-
wage and other countries increase the probability that a plant will die in the United 
States, and is a feature of the results discussed in greater detail in Inui et al. (2009). 
 
In the remaining regressions of the table we consider the robustness of our findings to 
different estimation techniques. The number of observations of exit in the sample is 
low.  King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) demonstrate that logit and probit models can lead 
to an under-estimation of the probability of rare events, and as the event becomes 
rarer in an increasingly dysfunctional manner.  Regression 4 in Table 5 repeats the 
regression in column 2 but follows the methodology outlined by King and Zeng 
(2001a, 2001b) to correct the standard errors for rare events.  The King and Zeng 
method works by choosing a random sample of the 0’s (non-exit in the current 
context), estimating a logit regression and then correcting the coefficients and 
standard errors post-estimation (using information on the proportion of 1’s in the 
population).  Their general suggestion is to choose between 2-5 times the numbers of 
0’s and 1’s.  As a second robustness test we use a Cox proportional hazard model 
rather than a probit estimator.  Non-parametric estimators have proved popular in the 
plant exit literature with Mata and Portugal (2002) and Bandick (2007) employing   11
them to describe the survival rates of Swedish multinational owned, and Spanish, 
plants.  
 
The results in regression 4 and 5 of Table 3 are robust to this change.  We continue to 
find that large, capital intensive, productive plants with low wage costs are less likely 
to exit.  The firm-level variables are also unchanged.  Importers and multiplant firms 
remain more likely to close plants, as are multinationals.  Sunk costs continue to be 
the sole significant industry-level determinant of exit.  The only departure from the 
initial results is that sunk costs are insignificant when the rare events logit estimator is 
used. 
 
4.  Exit within Multiplant Firms 
 
Given that multinational firms have been shown to be more likely to shut their plants, 
an interesting question that follows from this is, can we identify the characteristics of 
those plants and the possible motives behind their closure. In Table 6 we consider 
these questions separately for multiplant firms that only have operations domestically 
and those with foreign affiliates. In the following regressions the plant variables are 
measured relative to the firm.  For example, the size ratio is the natural logarithm of 
the number of plant employees divided by the number of workers employed by the 
firm.  Similar measures are constructed for capital and input intensity.  Difficulties in 
comparing productivity across possibly different industries of the firm lead us to 
exclude this variable from this part of the analysis.  
 
A striking feature of the results in Table 6 is the high degree of similarity between the 
type of plants that are closed by multinationals and domestic multiplant firms. For 
example, regardless of whether the firm has affiliates abroad or not, plants that are 
large and capital intensive relative to the firm are significantly less likely to exit. For 
multinational firms there is again the suggestion that this decision to shut plants may 
be associated with the decision to move production out of Japan, to offshore. 
Relatively high wage plants owned by multinational firms are 6 percentage points 
more likely to close, but we do not find any such effect for domestic multiplant firms.  
This may be because domestic multiplant firms are constrained by keiretsu networks   12
and the added necessity of locating within an industrial cluster to fulfil just-in-time 
contracts. 
 
To capture the how the plant’s position in the production chain affects its survival we 
also include a measure of the input intensity of the plant relative to the firm.  Input 
intensity is defined as the ratio of intermediate inputs to sales. We interpret higher 
values as indicating upstream production
10. The results suggest that multinationals 
and domestic multiplant firms are more likely to close plants producing intermediate 
inputs rather than final goods.  The magnitude of the effect is again not drastically 
different between multinationals and other multi-plant firms; a one standard deviation 
change increase in relative input intensity raises the probability of exit by 32 and 27 
percentage points at MNE and multiplant firms respectively. Given that one motive 
for closing upstream plants producing intermediate inputs is to take advantage of 
lower production costs abroad it would seem that this has affected all multi-plant 
firms within Japan to a similar extent and not disproportionately multinational firms.  
 
                                                 
10 Another possibility is that input intensity could be measuring a plant’s value added to production.   13
Table 6: Multivariate Probits of Plant Exit within Multiplant Firms
Regression
(6) (7) (8)





















Export Dummy .01 -.03 .05
(.37) (-1.46) (1.43)
Import Dummy .02 .03* -.02
(1.10) (1.76) (-.70)
Same Industry Dummy -.00 -.00 -.00
(-.13) (-.01) (-.07)
R&D Intensity -.01 -.07*** .03**
(-.55) (-3.88) (2.00)
Industry-level Variables
Grubel-Lloyd Index -.00 .00 .03
(-.05) (.03) (1.05)
LWPEN .09 .08 .07
(.83) (.62) (1.56)
OTHPEN -.08 -.24 .00
(-.64) (-1.64) (.03)
Sunk Costs -.06*** -.01 -.06**
(-2.73) (-.44) (-2.03)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 31520 33177 64825
Pseudo R
2 .16 .14 .14
 
Notes: Standardised coefficients reported. Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
parentheses. The industry dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. The 
multinational dummy includes domestic and foreign multinationals. The number of observations in 
regression 8 exceeds the number in 6 and 7 because in the larger sample fewer observations are 
dropped due to collinearity. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
confidence. 
 
The explanation behind the significance of the importer variable in Table 5 would 
appear to be the behaviour of non-MNE multiplant firms. Importing multinationals 
are not more likely to close their plants, whereas plants belonging to domestic 
multiplant firms that import are 3 percentage points more likely to exit.  Indeed this   14
variable represents one of the few significant differences in the determinants of 
behaviour between MNEs and non-MNEs. We take its significance to indicate that the 
mode of offshoring differs between these two types of firm.  For example, as shown 
by the relative wage variable, multinationals offshore through relocating their 
operations abroad but domestic multiplant firms outsource production instead (they 
import from non-affiliates rather than affiliates).  This is in line with Antas and 
Helpman (2004) who suggest that the costs of relocating production abroad are 
greater than those associated with outsourcing. These results also suggest that when 
studying the consequences of outward FDI decisions on the performance of the firms 
further insight would be gained if the analysis were broadened to include all 
offshoring decisions. 
 
We also include in the regression a variable indicating whether the plant operates in 
the same 3 digit industry as the firm itself. Kimura and Fujii (2003) have previously 
suggested that plant closure in Japan was attributable to firm’s expansion into 
industries outside their core competencies in the 1980s.  We do not find this to be the 
case. Similarly exporting status continues to be an insignificant determinant of exit.  
Elsewhere in the literature exporters have been found to be less likely to close due to 
their superior characteristics (see The International Study Group on Exports and 
Productivity, (2007) for a cross-country comparison).  Finally there are reasons to 
believe that that a firm’s R&D expenditure may affect the markets in which a firm 
operates.  Baldwin and Gu (2004) find Canadian exporters to perform more R&D than 
non-exporters.   For Spain, Perez et al. (2004) find that R&D intensity lowers the 
hazard rate.  Kimura and Kiyota (2003) also find Japanese firms which conduct R&D 
face lower hazard rates.  R&D intensity lowers the probability of exit only among 
domestic multiplant firms where a one standard deviation increase in firm R&D 
intensity reduces the threat of closure by 7 percentage points. 
 
The effect of the industry-level variables remains similar to those found in Table 5, in 
particular the globalisation variables are again not found to affect closure among 
multiplant firms.  The sunk cost variable remains significant. A one standard 
deviation increase in sunk costs reduces exit by 6 percentage points but only for MNE 
owned plants.   
   15
In regression 8 we test whether the behaviour of MNEs and non-MNEs can be more 
formally accepted as different. We pool the observations on all multi-plant firms and 
then include a multinational dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
either a domestic or foreign multiplant multinational and zero if the owner is a 
domestic multiplant firm and then interact this variable with the plant, firm and 
industry variables. For reasons of space we report the coefficient estimates for the 
interactions between the multinational variable and the plant, firm and industry 
variables only.  The results of the full model may be found in Appendix Table 2.   
 
The results from this regression confirm that multinationals and multi-plant non-
MNEs behave similarly in their choice about which plants to shut. In this sense 
domestic MNEs are no more likely to shutdown plants than domestic multiplant 
firms.  The interactions only show a few significant differences between the criteria 
used to close plants across these firms.  Specifically, multinationals are significantly 
more likely to close high wage plants and those in industries with low sunk costs.  
Likewise R&D intensity interaction shows that domestic multiplant firms with high 
R&D intensities are significantly less likely to close plants than similar 
multinationals.   
 
5.  Why are Multinationals “Footloose”? 
 
The results in the previous section showed that multinationals are more likely to close 
relatively small, capital un-intensive, high-wage and upstream plants.  Given that on 
average MNEs plants display superior performance characteristics compared to non-
MNEs, in this section of the paper we consider whether it is this process of closing 
plants that are weaker relative to the rest of the firm that explains why MNEs were 
found to be footloose in Table 5.  
 
To examine this question we return to the regression model explaining plant closure 
across all firm types to which we add an interaction term between the MNE (0/1) 
indicator with relative plant variables from Table 6. To examine which of the relative 
plant variables has the strongest effect on the direct MNE variable, the ‘footloose’ 
effect, we introduce these one at a time across regressions 9 to 12 and then include all 
of them in regression 13.    16
 
Comparing across regressions 9 to 12 it is clear that two of the relative plant measures 
are capable of explaining all of the footloose effect of MNEs from Table 5, relative 
size and relative input intensity, whereas the plant’s capital intensity and its relative 
wage costs has little or no effect on the size or significance of the MNE indicator. The 
results from regression 9 suggest that plants that are small in size are more likely to 
close, to which we can also add that there is an additional effect on that probability for 
those plants that are small compared to the rest of the multinational firm. We find a 
similar additional effect from capital intensity of MNE plants, although unlike the size 
variables this reduces the size of the MNE effect by 11 per cent. Regression 11 also 
suggests an effect from input intensity of the plant compared to the rest of the MNE, 
but this enters with the unexpected sign compared to the results found in Table 6. 
Regression 13 suggests that this finding may be a consequence of excluding the other 
firm level controls. In this regression we find that size, relative capital intensity, but 
now also relative wage explains why MNEs are footloose. 
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Table 7: Determinants of the "Footloose" Effect
       Regression
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Multinational Dummy .00 .08*** .09*** -.01 .01 .05*** .09*** .09*** .04*** .04*** -.39***
(.29) (7.62) (8.52) (-.35) (.71) (4.09) (8.01) (8.13) (3.27) (3.08) (-4.83)
Multiplant Dummy .16*** .18*** .18*** .16*** .17*** .05*** .16*** .18*** -.44*** -.31*** -.11
(16.71) (19.49) (19.88) (15.03) (16.19) (3.86) (16.43) (19.36) (-9.88) (-4.27) (-1.34)
Plant Relative to Firm Variables Interacted with the Multinational Dummy
Size
Plant/Size












Firm -.13*** .04 -.59***
(-5.00) (1.21) (-5.35)
Plant Relative to Firm Variables Interacted with the Domestic Multiplant Dummy
Size
Plant/Size












Firm -.70*** -.47*** -.20*
(-14.04) (-4.73) (-1.87)
Plant-level Variables
Size -.38*** -.40*** -.40*** -.41*** -.38*** -.35*** -.40*** -.40*** -.45*** -.41*** -.44***
(-27.82) (-29.72) (-29.62) (-31.44) (-26.20) (-24.54) (-29.77) (-29.88) (-36.24) (-21.51) (-22.17)
Capital Intensity -.10*** -.08*** -.09*** -.10*** -.09*** -.11*** -.03** -.09*** -.12*** -.06*** -.06***
(-10.48) (-7.41) (-9.22) (-9.97) (-7.95) (-11.18) (-2.51) (-9.53) (-12.22) (-4.85) (-4.84)
TFP -.05*** -.05*** -.05*** -.05*** -.05*** -.05*** -.05*** -.05*** -.07*** -.06*** -.06***
(-5.42) (-5.24) (-5.12) (-5.49) (-5.33) (-5.65) (-5.52) (-5.29) (-7.58) (-7.01) (-7.22)
Wages .10*** .11*** .10*** .10*** .09*** .09*** .11*** .12*** .09*** .09*** .08***
(8.46) (9.26) (8.11) (8.87) (7.01) (8.15) (9.06) (9.01) (7.58) (6.80) (6.20)
Firm-level Variables
Export Dummy .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00
(.30) (.51) (.48) (.37) (.30) (.14) (.50) (.49) (.13) (.13) (.18)
Import Dummy .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03** .03*** .03** .02** .03** .03**
(2.68) (2.64) (2.68) (2.69) (2.82) (2.41) (2.65) (2.52) (2.15) (2.24) (2.36)
R&D Intensity .01 .01 .01 .01 .00 -.02 .01 .01 -.02 -.02** -.02*
(.49) (1.24) (1.47) (1.07) (.46) (-1.56) (.85) (1.04) (-1.51) (-2.09) (-1.81)
Industry-level Variables
Grubel-Lloyd Index -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.02
(-.41) (-.34) (-.33) (-.38) (-.36) (-.30) (-.38) (-.39) (-.32) (-.33) (-.38)
LWPEN .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .01
(.33) (.31) (.34) (.31) (.30) (.34) (.30) (.31) (.32) (.30) (.22)
OTHPEN -.06 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.05
(-.80) (-.77) (-.79) (-.82) (-.73) (-.73) (-.79) (-.81) (-.66) (-.67) (-.64)
Sunk Costs -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03***
(-2.73) (-2.75) (-2.73) (-2.71) (-2.75) (-2.75) (-2.76) (-2.73) (-2.77) (-2.79) (-2.73)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 131559 131538 131559 131559 131538 131559 131538 131559 131559 131538 131538
Pseudo R
2 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .16 .15 .15 .16 .16 .16
 
Notes: Standardised coefficients reported. Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
parentheses. The industry dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
Our results demonstrate that multinationals are not inherently “footloose”.  Rather 
they point to multinationals closing weaker plants.  A similar process was found for   18
multi-plant non-MNEs in Table 6. In the remainder of the table we therefore repeat 
the analysis to investigate whether we can explain why multiplant ownership 
increases the probability of exit and to see if closure at these firms is similar to the 
patterns we observe among multinationals.  We model these as an interaction term 
between a dummy variable indicating non-MNE multi-plant firms. Again we 
introduce the relative plant characteristics one at a time in regressions 14 to 17 and 
then all together in regression 18. It is worth noting that as we still include in the 
regression the multi-plant indicator (MNEs and non-MNEs) the inclusion of these 
new relative plant characteristics terms also tends to affect the estimated marginal 
effect found on the MNE indicator. 
 
In regressions 14 to 17 the interactions between the multiplant dummy and the plant-
to-parent variables show that, like multinationals, multiplant firms are also less prone 
to closing large, capital intensive and downstream plants.  Indeed relative plant size 
appears to be the most important driver of the effect multiplant ownership has on 
plant survival since it explains 72% of the multiplant coefficient.  Unlike with 
multinationals, the multiplant dummy remains significant and positive in regressions 
14 to 16 however. A difference between multi-plant and non-multi-plant firms 
remains.  The inclusion of the relative input intensity of the plant shows that 
multiplant firms are 70 percentage points less likely to close upstream plants.   
However, unlike in the previous regressions, when we condition on a plants relative 
material intensity multiplant firms are 44 percentage points less likely to close a plant 
relative to all other types of firm.  In regression 18 these results persist though they 
are smaller and the relative wage variable becomes insignificant. 
 
Finally, in regression 19 we include the interaction effects between the plant relative 
to parent variables and the multinational and multiplant non-MNE indicators.  Perhaps 
most strikingly from this regression we now find that, conditional on plant, firm, 
industry and interaction effects, relative to single plant domestic firms multinationals 
are actually 39 percentage points less likely to shutdown their plants.  It appears that 
the ‘footloose’ effect is more than attributable to multinational firms, or indeed all 
multi-plant firms, closing weaker plants.  Once we account for this difference in 
behaviour we find that domestic MNEs are actually deeply embedded into their home 
economies.    19
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated why multinational ownership is frequently found to raise 
the probability of plant death using unique Japanese data that links plant data with 
firm data.  We find that the multinational “footloose” effect is attributable to 
multinationals closing their weakest plants.  Specifically, small and downstream 
plants face significantly higher exit likelihoods when they are owned by a 
multinational firm even when we control for a host of plant, firm and industry 
determinants of death. 
 
The above results have a potentially interesting implication for aggregate productivity 
growth in Japan. Within the Melitz model of heterogenous firms and international 
trade, trade liberalisation is welfare improving because it leads to the death of the 
least productive firms.  Subsequently, their output is then reallocated towards more 
productive firms within the industry which raises aggregate productivity.  An 
assumption of the model is that the least productive firms will always be the ones that 
exit.  However, our results suggest that when a plant is weaker compared to other 
units within the same firm, but both larger and more productive relative to other firms 
in the same industry, its death could disrupt the positive effect that increased 
globalisation is predicted to have on aggregate industry productivity. Based on a 
Griliches and Regev decomposition of aggregate productivity growth we find for 
Japan that this effect is small. Entry and exit account for 0 per cent of total aggregate 
productivity growth.
11 This is perhaps explained by the Japanese context however, 
which has been characterised by both low productivity growth (references) and low 
rates of entry and exit (Caballero et al., 2003; Peek and Rosengren, 2003; Ahearne 
and Shinada, 2005; and Inui et al., 2009). It would therefore be interesting to 
investigate this possible negative effect of globalisation in other contexts. 
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Appendix 
 
Total Fator Productivity 
 
There are 48 manufacturing industries in our dataset.  Total factor productivity (TFP) 
is calculated for each plant relative to the industry average.  Following Good et al. 
(1997) and Aw et al. (1997), we define the TFP level of establishment p in year t in a 
certain industry in comparison with the TFP level of a hypothetical representative 
establishment in year 0 in that industry as follows 
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where Qft, Sift and Xift denote the gross output of plant f in year t, the cost share of 
factor i for establishment p’s input of factor i in year t.  Variables with an upper bar 
denote the industry average of that variable.  We use 1994 as the base year.  Capital, 
labour and real intermediate inputs are used as factor inputs.   
 
  The representative establishment for each industry is defined as a hypothetical 
establishment whose gross output as well as input and cost share of all production 
factors are identical to the industry average.  The first two terms on the right hand 
side of equation (1) denote the gap between plant f’s TFP level in year t and the 
representative establishment’s TFP level in year t and the representative 
establishment’s TFP level in the base year.  lnTFPft in equation (1) constitutes the 
gap between establishment f’s TFP level in year t and the representative 




Globalisation has been shown to cause exit.  The source of import competition in the 
US affects plant survival and causes firms to adjust their product mix (Bernard and 
Jensen, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006).  We disaggregate import penetration into low-  24
wage import penetration (LWPEN) and import penetration from all other countries 
(OTHPEN)




















where LWPENit represents low-wage country import competition in industry i at time 
t, Mit
LW is the value of imports from low-wage countries in industry i at time t, Mit  
and Xit represents the value of total imports and exports in industry i at time t and Yit 
denotes output in industry i during year t.  OTHPENit denotes imports from all 
countries except low-wage economies. 
 
Bernard et al. (2006) find that both forms of import competition raise the probability 
of closure.  A one standard deviation increase in LWPEN increases the probability of 
plant exit by 2.2 percentage points which is considerably greater than the effect of 
OTHPEN.  Similar results are found by Greenaway et al. (2008) for Sweden.  In their 
results, the estimated coefficient on imports from outside the OECD is twice as large 
as that for OECD imports.  
 
Intra-industry trade is often found to have a positive effect upon firm exit.  As 
international trade grows firms diversify their product range which may lead them to 
enter new industries and exit sectors they operate in currently.  It has been established 
by Greenaway et al. (2008) that firms do not just closedown their operations, they 
switch to new industries too.  Using Swedish manufacturing data they find that intra-
industry trade leads to exit through plant closure, and, mergers and acquisition.  This 
is also found by Bernard et al. (2006) for the United States: firms which are 
confronted by low-wage import competition sometimes switch to more capital 
intensive sectors. 
 
Our measure of intra-industry trade is constructed using the Grubel-Lloyd index: 
 
                                                 
12 Countries are deemed to be low-wage where they have a GDP less than 5% that of Japan.   25
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where GLijt is the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in industry i in year t, Xi 
are exports in industry i during year t and Mit are imports in industry i during year t. 
  
The industry variables mentioned so far capture the influence of globalisation upon 
plant exit.  We also include a measure of sunk costs.  The empirical literature has 
identified sunk costs as being an important factor in shaping exit.  Sunk costs also 
play a key role in determining exporting behaviour (Roberts and Tybout, 1997) and 
can affect the distribution of productivity in the industry (Aw et al. {2002}).   
 
Appendix Table 1: Industry-level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Grubel-Lloyd Index 144739 .50 .27 .01 1.00
  Trade that is intra-industry
Sunk Costs 155714 .01 .01 .00 .05
  Minimum of entry and exit rates
Import Competition 121760 .09 .09 .00 .67
  Imports divided by apparent consumption
LWPEN 121760 .03 .04 .00 .28
  Low-wage imports
OTHPEN 121760 .06 .06 .00 .55
  Imports from all other countries
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Appendix Table 2: Multivariate Probits of Plant Exit within Multiplant Firms
Regression
(6) (7) (8)
















Firm .32*** .27*** .39***
(11.29) (11.42) (11.45)
Firm-level Variables
Export Dummy .01 -.03 -.03
(.37) (-1.46) (-1.45)
Import Dummy .02 .03* .04*
(1.10) (1.76) (1.82)
Same Industry Dummy -.00 -.00 -.00
(-.13) (-.01) (-.20)
R&D Intensity -.01 -.07*** -.06***
(-.55) (-3.88) (-3.93)
Industry-level Variables
Grubel-Lloyd Index -.00 .00 -.00
(-.05) (.03) (-.06)
LWPEN .09 .08 .06
(.83) (.62) (.70)
OTHPEN -.08 -.24 -.09
(-.64) (-1.64) (-.93)





















 x Export Dummy .05
(1.43)
 x Import Dummy -.02
(-.70)
 x Same Industry Dummy -.00
(-.07)
 x R&D Intensity .03**
(2.00)
 x Grubel-Lloyd Index .03
(1.05)
 x LWPEN .07
(1.56)
 x OTHPEN .00
(.03)
 x Sunk Costs -.06**
(-2.03)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 31520 33177 64825
Pseudo R
2 .16 .14 .14
 
Notes: Standardised coefficients reported. Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
parentheses. The industry dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. The 
multinational dummy includes domestic and foreign multinationals. The number of observations in 
regression 8 exceeds the number in 6 and 7 because in the larger sample fewer observations are 
dropped due to collinearity. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
confidence. 